Popular contention, in the form of strikes, riots and protests, appears to be on the rise in China in recent years.
3 for a particular problem to an agent or agencies, and then offering solutions. 10 By proposing feasible strategies for action, compelling frames can rally the troops behind the cause and inspire political action, particularly when they coincide with shifts in "political opportunity structures." 11 However, the literature on framing collective action is based largely on research conducted in the Western Europe and the United States, and is therefore primarily shaped by historical patterns of contention in liberal polities. Clearly, "political opportunity structures" differ widely across the political spectrum, and dissenters in repressive authoritarian regimes face very different obstacles to movement organization, risk and opportunity structures and more limited resources for the dissemination of their views than do dissenters in democratic polities. 12 It therefore follows that the process of articulating and framing dissent in such systems is likely to be forged by such constraints and to manifest in ways that are fundamentally different from such patterns in liberal polities. State socialist systems, even those undergoing political and economic reforms, by definition exert considerable organizational control over society and effectively monopolize the resources available for social mobilization in ways that liberal democratic polities do not, effectively delimiting the opportunities for overt social contention to arise. As Tarrow notes, " [w] here power is centralized and conditions are homogenized, once opportunities are opened--as they were when Gorbachev began his reforms--framing and organizing a social movement are facilitated." However, in the absence of extraordinary "openings,"
The systematic repression of collective action in nonrepresentative systems lends a political coloration to ordinary acts. Listening to Verdi's operas during the period of Austrian control of Italy, or to rock music in the former Soviet Union, took on a symbolic importance that was difficult to repress or even recognize. 13 Subtle methods of framing dissent have been observed in several repressive political contexts; 14 in contemporary China, ironic or symbolic framings have been observed both prior to and concomitant with more familiar repertoires of popular contention. For example, Zweig noted that in recently years protesting villagers have chosen to adopt a mixed protest strategy, 4 alternating between the "policy-based resistance" repertoires involving legalistic maneuvering documented by O'Brien and Li, and civil disobedience, typified by mass sit-ins. 15 Zuo and
Benford argued that in the case of the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, deliberate nonaction and strategic restraint were both used as collective action frames in and of themselves, earning widespread sympathy and support for the students from Beijing city residents. 16 In their analysis of the same movement as a form of "political theater," Esherick and Wasserstrom documented the Chinese tradition of putting forth contentious claims in the form of petitions for the official redress of collective grievances. 17 In a sense, collective inaction is an invisible 'sit-in' in the Chinese political context. Its message is loud and clear, even without symbolic actions. 18 Whereas the success of protest frames in liberal polities is often measured by the degree that they are capable of inspiring long-term mobilization for overt political action, 19 in repressive systems in which overt challenges are often quickly countered with overwhelming and brutal repressive measures, the broad public circulation of a carefully encoded subversive message can succeed in nibbling away at the boundaries of hegemonic state control. Expressions of dissent such as these differ from the so-called "hidden transcripts" described by Scott--those "critiques of power spoken behind the back of the dominant" by subordinant groups --in that they are not "specific to a given social site and to a particular set of actors," 20 but instead operate in the public sphere in full view of the authorities, but at the boundaries of what is politically permissible in repressive regimes. In such environments, relatively subtle transgressions-for example, the 5 reproduction of the banned Norwegian flag on Christmas cards circulated in Nazi-occupied Norway, 21 or the reproduction of Mao-less Mao badges during the Cultural Revolution 22 -signal obliquely that dissenting pockets have managed to evade the repressive hand of the state, representing conceptual, if not organizational, "free spaces" within which collective identities and agendas may be forged. 23 As I will demonstrate, the range of popular responses to official censorial power in contemporary China clearly includes frames of dissent that are ambiguous and ironic by design, whether as an adaptation to current repression, or as part of a protest repertoire established in an earlier period.
The first form--the doorway couplet (menlian)--involves a strategic combination of ambiguity and irony to register and frame contentious claims, a poetic form of what Wierzbicka has termed "linguistic self defense" in totalitarian or semitotaltiarian states-a way of using language to "[give] expression…to those emotions, attitudes, and preoccupations which in a country dominated by severe political controls cannot be expressed openly." 24 In the case of the second form, that of popular qigong discourses, the outlines of the frame are somewhat less clear, but perhaps even more powerful insofar as they evoke broader and more fundamental normative claims outside of the "realm of state-approved cultural values." 25 As I will demonstrate, Falungong texts involve a challenge to the state's claims on the bodies of individual practitioners, elaborate an alternative hierarchy of values and detail a set of practices designed to realize these goals. 26 The political dimensions of this process become clearer when one views the prescriptive elements of such texts as metaphorical discourses on the nature of the Chinese "body politic."
The inherent power of both forms rests in their ability to encapsulate a set of moral critiques of state power from within the boundaries of hegemonic state control.
As such, both potentially represent examples of what Humphrey has called "evocative transcripts:" texts that are "intended to elicit or evoke a particular interpretation beyond the surface meaning." Evocative transcripts are ambiguous by design. They come to the fore in political quasihegemonies, when the previous codes of classes and ethnic groups are suppressed and two pervasive new kinds of discourse are maintained throughout society by force and fear: a highly ideological, stilted, and mostly written official discourse, and 'all the rest,'
which may be oral and informal but nonetheless must maintain a semblance of conformity in public. 27 Ironically, under such conditions, the most viable form of dissent may well be that which masquerades as the politically irrelevant beneath a mask of compliance.
DOORWAY COUPLETS
Doorway couplets -commonly referred to as menlian, duilian ("parallel couplets"), or chunlian ("spring couplets")-consist of two counterbalanced phrases, often poetic in nature, written on narrow strips of paper that are then used to frame the main entrance to a residence or official building. Most commonly displayed during the Chinese New Year, they may also be posted to mark other prominent occasions, such as weddings, birthdays and the opening of new businesses. 28 The phrases are identical in length, and are parallel insofar as the pronunciation, tone and meanings of the characters in the phrases relate to each other, sometimes in complex ways. In some cases, the balancing of the phrases revolves around a simple repetition of a single character, while in others the phrases are linked by the use of a similar image or metaphor. 29 The structural integrity of the couplet as a composition is defined by either the fundamental agreement or contrast of the two lines, and the centrality of a single idea expressed differently by its two members. 30 With respect to doorway couplets, to these two counterbalanced lines a third (hengpi)
is sometimes pasted on the horizontal lintel above, complementing or uniting the antithesis. 31 The custom of hanging doorway couplets appears to have talismanic origins, and many scholars agree that such couplets originally embellished the fierce likenesses of guardian spirits painted around doors and gates as a protection against evil. 32 Over time, the couplets themselves came to be viewed as amulets of a sort, presaging auspicious outcomes for the upcoming year and Many households eschew the mass-produced versions in favor of composing their own verse, and examples of such couplets are occasionally cited by Party and state officials as rough barometers of public opinion, particularly when they laud or find fault with particular policies. 35 For example, one frustrated deputy to the National Peoples' Congress pointed out that between October 1993 and April 1994, the CPC Central Committee had convened two national conferences on rural work, both of which resulted new rounds of exhortations and policy statements, but neither had produced substantive measures to ameliorate the "peasant burden"
problem. Charging that "attaching importance to agriculture" had degenerated into mere sloganeering, he cited one doorway couplet composed by a resident of his rural district, which read: "Today a meeting, tomorrow a meeting, we have a meeting everyday," and "You also ("[they think they] cannot be touched"). 37 The popularity of such forms during this period is no doubt due to the highly charged political atmosphere of the times and the overarching tutelage of Maoist totalitarianism. The unspoken part of the phrase is clearly evoked in the mind of the listener, but because it is never actually uttered, both the speaker and the listener are protected in a sort of collusive communicative act, such as when in English a person might comment to another as a third enters the room: "Speak of the devil…" and the listener clearly "hears" the second half of the aphorism in his or her own mind.
One couplet that appeared over the dormitory doorway at rural commune in Hunan's
Yichang County employed such a literary device to cynically deride the so-called "Dazhai big cooking pot" system of allocating workpoints without regard for the amount of labor actually completed. 38 Yichang County commune members apparently privately regarded the new workpoint system as the cause for an overall decline in agricultural output, despite an endless stream of local press reports lauding the new system and predicting a bumper harvest that year.
In an act of defiance, a group of the commune members affixed an "enigmatic" (yinyu) doorway couplet to the dormitory entrance that read on one vertical post "2, 3, 4, 5" (er, san, si, wu) and 9 "6, 7, 8, 9" (liu, qi, ba, jiu) on the other. Across the threshold a sheet simply read: "south, north"
(nan, bei). The riddle-like meaning of the couplet resides in the missing elements of the verse, but was nonetheless obvious to the commune members entering the gate: lacking a "one," short a "ten," no east and no west. By replacing the "one" and "ten" with the homophonous characters for "clothing" and "food," and reading "east" and "west" as a compound word, the resulting phrase meant that those residing within had neither clothing nor food, and therefore nothing at all (que yi shao shi, mei you dongxi).
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In a related instance during the same period in Sichuan's Chengdu, normal production and shipping practices were so disrupted that tobacco was a relatively rare commodity. Across the lintel, the horizontal term wryly proclaimed: "Economy takes command" (Jingji guashuai), a bold perversion of a popular state-endorsed campaign slogan at the time (zhengzhi guashuai, "politics takes command"). Yet for smokers familiar with the low quality of the tobacco sold under that brand name, the doorway couplet also served as an ironic reminder of the inefficiencies inherent in centralized economic planning under the Maoist regime. 40 Couplets deriding the conduct of officials also have a long history in China, and the moral censure of a mocking verse over the main gate of home or public building can be an effective way of lodging a public protest while avoiding retribution. 41 Official and popular concern over the lavish consumption habits of some cadres-and in particular the use of public funds to underwrite orgies of so-called "big eating and big drinking" [dachi dahe] homeowner turned out to be a village cadre whose rent-seeking practices had purportedly been so lucrative that the neighbors envisioned him or her staying home to count up ill-gotten gains instead of attending to public duties. 45 Like the anonymously posted libelous bits of verse that 11 circulated in English towns during the eighteenth century recorded by E.P. Thompson, the potency of this form of protest rests in the power of public censure to impose a collective moral standard within a community.
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By any of the current standards that prevail in the collective action literature, the examples cited above do not measure up well as protest frames. Most do not clearly define a problem, assign blame to a particular agent, or offer feasible solutions to social or political ills.
Many lack clear "identity components" delineating collective adversarial agents. Perhaps most significant of all, there is little evidence to suggest that any of these doorway couplets have directly inspired groups to openly confront state authorities, demobilize their adversaries and press their claims forward. However, these couplets are suggestive of a very different, but no less important, set of dynamics underlying the articulation of political dissent under an authoritarian regime. The strategic use of irony and ambiguity in these subtly subversive framings serves as a kind of protective cloak shielding both the speaker/author and the listener/reader from the penetrating gaze of the state while simultaneously delivering a political critique. The prosaic quality of such minor subversions contributes to their utility in the authoritarian political context.
As Scott has aptly noted, apparently innocuous low-level forms of resistance can indeed register a cumulative effect over the long term. 47 At the same time, couplets have frequently appeared at the sites of more overt oppositional mobilization against state authorities. Sectarian rebel groups dating to the late imperial period, such as the Taipings and the Triads, were known to post seditious couplets portending apocalyptic ruin, and early twentieth-century activists often used derisive and mocking couplets to shame national political leaders and forward their agendas. 48 More recently, one parallel couplet that was reproduced anonymously on posters around Tiananmen Square during the 1989 student demonstrations took aim at absolute monopoly on political power enjoyed by the central authorities: Finally, and perhaps most significant for the study of collective action frames, many qigong texts use the body as a metaphoric or metonymic frame within which to register alienation, disaffection and protest, and to articulate alternative political realities. The deployment of the body as a frame for dissent is particularly compelling in the Chinese context in part because of the prevalence of "somatization"--"the expression of personal and social distress in an idiom of bodily complaints and medical help seeking"--in popular culture. In their study of individuals suffering from depression in Hunan, the Kleinmans discovered unusually high levels of somatized complaints associated with social stress brought on by large-scale political, economic and institutional change among Chinese patients, who commonly saw themselves as powerless in the face of such pressures. 55 Inordinate numbers of patients presenting physical complaints in the absence of defined organic pathology, primarily headaches, dizziness and insomnia, were diagnosed with and then treated for neurasthenia (shenjing shuairuo) by Chinese 14 health professionals. The Kleinmans attributed the prevalence of this diagnosis in large part to "the universe of symbolic meanings that comprises the Chinese cultural tradition."
The core principles of this cultural world view center on the harmonizing of interpersonal relations, the sociocentric orientation of the self, and for these reasons the constitution of affect as moral position in a social field of reciprocal behavior. Denial of dysphoria is also of course a neutral and safe position to hold in an ideological context in which depression signifies potentially dangerous political implications: disaffiliation, alienation and potential opposition. Here, as a complementary process to disease causation, we have the cultural construction of illness.
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"Somatized" disorders-neurasthenia, depression, recurring disequilibrium and sleeplessnesswere especially common among three groups: former victims of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, patients who were particularly vulnerable within the sociopolitical structure, and those whose access to local resources was blocked in some way. 57 Relatedly, Ots documented dramatic increases in the numbers of spontaneous qigong practitioners with somatized disorders gathering in public parks in the wake of campaigns to reassert CCP orthodoxy throughout the 1980s. Many of the participants drawn to these practices claimed to be suffering from thoracic depression (xiongmen) as a result of fear and repeated repression of dysphoric emotional states. 58 Thus, whereas most Falungong practitioners may not see themselves as politically defiant, Party and state officials have long regarded them as at least potentially so, in part due to their perceived alienation, depression and vulnerability within the current political system. At stake for both practitioners and officials is the public recognition that widespread social ills and dissatisfaction do exist, that they are often expressed as physical symptoms and that the current health care system is unable to adequately address this problem.
The official perception of qigong practitioners as potentially subversive is bolstered by the claims of some qigong masters linking the perceived "symptoms" of their followers to 15 pressing social problems. Many modern qigong practices treat such symptomatic social disorders by recognizing the body as a microcosm of the larger body politic and strive to redirect or alter the flow of universal energy through both the personal body of the practitioner and that of the state. Falungong texts are particularly explicit in this regard, first presenting a diagnosis of the Chinese body politic that assigns moral responsibility for somatized social ills to the party-state, and then prescribing a course of treatment which implicitly pits the individual practitioner against the moral foundations of the regime. As such, Falungong's bodily cultivation techniques--at least as they are described and explained in authorized texts by the group's enigmatic founder and leader--can be read as a type of evocative frame registering a series of highly contentious claims against the present regime. Like the ironic doorway couplets discussed above, the power of Li
Hongzhi's subversive message resides precisely in the ambiguous manner in which its contentious claims are framed: by deploying the bodies of individual practitioners against the hegemonic practices of the state, Falungong texts can be read either as a metonymic attack on state power, or as a set of quasi-sectarian discourses on mystical body cultivation techniques. 59 Li Hongzhi, the former grain official who is Falungong's official leader, emphatically asserts that modern scientific knowledge, upon which the CCP has traditionally based its claim to legitimate rule, is by definition limited and narrow. His elaborate critiques of the officially sanctioned view of human history underscore apparent contradictions in the scientific analysis of various artifacts. Proposing that his paranormal investigations have revealed that the current universe is "an entity compounded after nine explosions" and that the earth has been destroyed and recreated many times, Li's account of human history rejects both current scientific methods and the theory of evolution. 60 Rather, Li embraces "Buddha Law," which he equates with the "Dao" force of Daoist belief, which is capable of revealing "the secrets of the cosmos, time and space and the human body. It can genuinely distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, and establish to right view by eradicating all fallacies." 61 Party officials have responded to Li's 16 claims by branding them as "psuedo-science" and "feudal superstition," politically potent terms against which the state has been defining its core tasks throughout the reform period. Every kind of complicated social phenomena, countless vulgar and unhealthy things, those [appealing to] the 'seven emotions and six desires,' there is never a minute when these aren't interfering with practitioners. Television, movies, written materials published by the media, these attract you to do things to become a stronger or more practical person among the ordinary (changren zhong). If you cannot overcome the lure of these things, the distance between you and the nature (xinxing) and mental state of a practitioner and the skill (gong) that you will acquire will be lessened. 67 Li's writings and addresses make repeated reference to Lei Feng, the PLA officer/moral exemplar popularized under Mao during the Cultural Revolution period, in order to emphasize the current moral decline he notes in contemporary Chinese society. Contrasting the ethical fidelity of the Falungong community of believers to the widespread disaffection and cynicism prevalent in the wider society, he proposes that he is responsible for restoring a sense of ideological coherence and moral rectitude that is lacking in the "socialist spiritual civilization" of today. 68 At the same time, however, a simple shift back to the Maoist model is no longer a feasible solution.
One result of the current Party embrace of free market reform is a society motivated largely by greed, excessive consumerism and raging competitiveness in the race to get ahead:
Of course, moral criteria in contemporary human society have already undergone a change, and standards have been twisted and perverted (niuqule). If a person were emulating Lei Feng now, perhaps we'd have to say that s/he is mentally unsound. But in the '50s and 60's who would have said he was psychologically ill? Mankind's moral standards are in a great decline, public morals are declining day by day, and people are bent on nothing but profit; if it benefits them, they are willing to harm others, and strive to overtake each other for personal gain by fair means or foul. 69 Li is equally critical of the policies of the pre-reform period, and argues that the Maoist moral order left widespread and profound somatized scars on the Chinese body politic. In particular, Li diagnoses an epidemic of what he refers to as "Eastern" [Dongfang] or "Asian"
[Yazhou] jealousy among the Chinese, which he associates with particular set of physical manifestations similar to the "paradigmatic symptoms" recorded by the Kleinmans in the repertoire of somatized social ills in contemporary China. 70 Li traces the proximate cause of this disease to the absolute egalitarianism (juedui pingjun zhuyi) we went for in the past [that] completely messed up people's minds…Now, under the reforms, basic inequalities have caused extreme envy in those not benefiting from the reforms, causing many to feel 'psychologically unbalanced' and to repress their emotions to an unhealthy degree.
Those who do not understand that such successes are predetermined by the amount of 'virtue' (de) which inheres in an individual. Those who fail to recognize this compete and contend their whole lives, and suffer emotional wounds. They feel bitter, tired and mentally unbalanced. They do not eat or sleep well. They are disappointed. By the time they are old, they are in poor health and come down with all kinds of illnesses. 71 In response to the charge leveled against him by the current regime that he is propagating "feudal superstition," Li retorted by implicating the Party in the widespread disaffection common today, a direct result of past mass mobilization campaigns:
In fact, those who have undergone every kind of political movement possess very strong analytical ability. They had beliefs, had disappointments, had blind worship [mangmu chongbai], and they had lessons they learned from these experiences, especially during The core of Li's proposed cure for these social and somatic ills involves the implantation of a rotating dharma wheel in the lower abdomen of the practitioner, an event which many believers claim have cured them of a variety of health problems. The wheel emits energies that adjust and then fundamentally alter the body of the believer in order to prolong life and deter aging. Ultimately, when combined with the proper cultivation techniques, Falungong practices culminate in the realization of a "milk white body" for the practitioner in a higher dimension of reality, and the opening of the "heavenly eye," a vehicle of enhanced paranormal perception. 73 These practices produce complete physical and spiritual healing for both the traumas of the past and the confusion of today on both an individual and sociopolitical scale.
Thus, the heart of Li's ideological subversion is not only his diagnosis of the current regime and its policies as the source of widespread social ills, but also his promise to dispense a set of immediate and long-lasting cures for those crises which are therefore more compelling than those provided by the formalized institutions of the body politic. Li offers followers a refuge that not only overcomes the devastating wounds inflicted by the Party-state, but also promises to protect the private citizen from future crises as well: "When you encounter a tribulation, the benevolent compassion will help you overcome it. At the same time, my law body (fashen) will 
CONCLUSION
The political contours of illiberal regimes, even those undertaking liberalizing reforms like those we seen in contemporary China, create particular challenges for the articulation and mobilization of dissent. Whereas the collective action frames studied in stable liberal polities by Snow, Benford and others are regarded as successful to the degree that they are capable of inspiring long-term and sustained mobilization for overt political action, such measures in repressive systems all too often spell an early, and sometimes tragic, end to dissenting movements, as was the case in the 1989 student movement in Beijing. Admitting that the "availability of evidence and locations of scholars have imparted a strong bias toward contemporary Western Europe and North America in existing work on political contention," prominent collective action theorists have noted the need for more information on precisely how protest is articulated, organized and pursued in the non-Western world. 75 Indeed, an expansion of interest in the field of collective action has led not only to more intensive study of social movements and political dissent in the contemporary context, but also to the development of new models of contentious politics tailored to the study of protest in illiberal and authoritarian contexts. In the Chinese case, recent contributions have demonstrated that opportunity structures and organizational constraints under authoritarian regimes created similar outcomes in student movements in Taiwan and mainland China; that one outcome of the organizations and processes associated with state socialism in the PRC has been the creation of large groups of individuals with like interests and experiences that may be mobilized (and demobilized) with relative swiftness to pursue a variety of goals; and that, in certain contexts, restraint and non action in the face of aggression from state authorities can themselves constitute a sort of frame for social protest. 76 This article contributes to this effort by broadening the current understanding of the framing process to include a positive appraisal of the utility of ambiguous, ironic and metonymic frames for the expression and mobilization of political dissent in highly repressive political contexts.
As I have argued, when overt challenges are most often quickly countered with overwhelming and brutal repressive measures, the sustained articulation and elaboration of alternative and oppositional discourses requires measures more complex than the organizational and identity markers currently employed by Western social scientists studying political dissent.
Such tools, while certainly useful for assessing the success of collective action movements in liberal democratic contexts, are simply not fine enough to discern the very nearly subterranean rumblings caused by the broad public circulation of carefully encoded subversive messages in authoritarian regimes. In the face of extraordinary repressive capacities, irony, ambiguity and double entendre represent adaptive strategies for contentious claim-making. In the two foregoing cases discussed above, indirection, imagery and allusion serve to create conceptual "open spaces"
within which collective identities may be forged and political agendas refined.
22
There is, furthermore, a good deal of evidence to suggest that the deployment of irony and indirection to frame dissident views has been on the rise since the 1990s. Barmé described a "dissident genre" of cultural products which emerged during the 1990s that sought to irritate State censors sufficient to provoke their rebuke, but without moving them to go so far as to actually ban the material. According to Barmé, the disapproval of the censors impart a niche-market value to such products unrelated to their artistic value, resulting in an explosion of "bankable dissent" in the public sphere, a development Barmé himself regards as "deeply disturbing." 77 However, as
Dutton pointed out of such critiques,
The fact that we may not like the particular form dissent takes, or approve of it being offered for sale, does not alter the dissident nature of the act, nor the delegitimising effect it has on the government…The process is productive in so far as it does not simply cater for a market, but actually produces it, by manufacturing desire. 78 By creating or engendering a public appreciation for such expression of alternative views, regardless of ultimate aims of the creators and purveyors of such products may be, the possibilities for future resistance are expanded. Thus, as the market for such products takes root, ironic, ambiguous and metonymic frames for the expression of dissent may well be on the rise in post-Deng China, even as liberalizing reforms result in the overall relaxation of ideological controls.
Yet indirection and irony are by no means the only tools available to protesters in the face of repressive regimes. As many students of collective action have already demonstrated, protest movements can and do succeed even in highly repressive political contexts, and in fact often do so by deploying a mix of strategies and repertoires to advance their cause, many of which would appear to be suboptimal, counterproductive or simply ineffective in stable democratic systems.
The simultaneous emergence of subtler framing strategies with more overtly oppositional forms of collective mobilization-contentious doorway couplets along with rising waves of rural tax protests, and qigong cultivation techniques deployed alongside mass civil disobedience-suggest 
